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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the order 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 29, 1975, an incident occurred in Tooele 
County which lead investigating authorities to believe that a 
theft of Mountain Bell wire had taken place. The following day, 
one William Holton was arrested on a charge of "grand larceny," 
(R-24-26,36). His attorney contacted the then deputy county 
attorney for Tooele County and was advised that no charges would 
be filedagains~ the respondent because there was not sufficient 
evidence to prosecute him, (R-53). 
Although no such facts appear in the record of this case 
to support its allegations, the appellant has claimed that on 
September 30, 1975, a complaint was filed against Holton, char-
ging him with theft, (appellant's brief, p.2). The appellant 
also alleges that after a series of continuances, Holton waived 
his right to a preliminary examination, entered a plea of guilty 
to a lesser offense, and as part of plea negotiations agreed to 
give a statement implicating the respondent in the purported 
theft, (id.). On the basis of that statement, according to the 
appellant, a complaint was issued on July 11, 1978, three months 
after the statement was given, and a warrant of arrest was issued, 
(R-5 and R-6) . 
The respondent was arrested in Wyoming on June 22, 1979. 
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The appellant has not contested the fact that for a portion of 
the time between the September 29, 1975 incident and the arrest 
on June 22, 1979, the respondent resided outside of Utah, (ap-
pellant's brief, p.6). The appellant has also conceded that 
during part of the time he was a non-resident the respondent 
was incarcerated, (T-7). 
The respondent made a motion to dismiss the charge 
against him on the ground that the state unreasonably delayed 
in bringing his prosecution to trial, (R-55). At the time the 
motion was made, the whereabouts of Holton, the principal wit-
ness against the respondent, were unknown (R-40). After a 
hearing, the court granted the motion, (T-11). Although the 
appellant's brief makes reference to a minute order granting the 
motion, (appellant's brief, p.6), none appears in the record 
filed with this Court. The written order of dismissal signed 
by the court was prepared by the Tooele County Attorney, (R-
inside cover) . 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE TOOELE COUNTY ATTORNEY LACKS AUTHORITY TO 
BRING THIS APPEAL. 
The powers of the county attorneys in the State of Utah 
are those prescribed by law, Art. VIII, Sec. 10, Constitution 
of Utah. The legislature enumerated and described those powers 
in Section 17-18-1, (all statutory references are to Utah Code 
Annotated unless otherwise noted) . Nowhere in that section was 
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the power given to county attorneys to prosecute appeals in the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
The power of the county attorney to appear in the Su-
preme Court is limited to rendering, " ... such assistance as 
may be required by the attorney general in all such cases that 
may be appealed to the Supreme Court," Section 17-18-1 (3). The 
primary responsibility for prosecuting appeals in the Supreme 
Court would appear to be with the attorney· general. It is 
his duty, "[t]o attend the Supreme Court of this state ... and 
prosecute or defend all causes to which the state ... is a 
party;" Section 67-5-1(1). 
In the present case, the Tooele County Attorney has ex-
ceeded the bounds of its statutory authority. It has not been 
"required by the attorney general to give assistance," in this 
appeal, rather, it has usurped the statutory function of the 
attorney general by filing a brief in this Court. The New 
Mexico Supreme Court was presented with a similar problem in 
State v. Aragon, 55 N.M. 431, 234 P.2d 356 (1950). 
At the time of the Aragon decision, New Mexico had a 
statute which, like Section 67-5-1 (1), provided that the attor-
ney general should have prosecuted and def ended all cases in 
the Supreme Court, Section 3-302 in Laws of New Mexico, 1941 
compilation. The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted the respon-
dent's contention that the duty to "prosecute" included taking 
an appeal and in response to the respondent's challenge to the 
-4-
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authority of a district attorney to take an appeal, held 
" ... the District Attorney had the authority to take the appeal 
but ... it is the prerogative and duty of the Attorney General 
to brief the case and present it in this court, and a District 
Attorney may only appear here in a criminal case by permission 
of the Attorney General and in association with him .... The 
motion to strike the brief of the District Attorney will be 
granted," 234 P.2d 356,358. 
This Court should adopt the ruling of the New Mexico 
Supreme Court and dismiss the brief filed by the Tooele County 
Attorney. If it does not, the result will encourage other 
county attorneys to prosecute appeals of their own and, con-
sequently could result in as many different approaches to one 
question of law as there are county attorneys. The consolida-
tion of the power to appear in the Supreme Court in one office, 
the attorney general, hopefully would lend more consistency to 
the appellate process. 
II 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE CHARGE. 
Under Section 77-51-4, a trial court of this state, 
may ... of its own motion ... in furtherance of justice 
order an action, information or indictment to be dismissed." 
Respondent sought to have the lower court invoke its power by 
making a motion to dismiss for undue delay on the part of the 
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prosecution. It is his contention that the lower court prop-
erly exercised its discretion in dismissing the case. 
After the alleged theft and the filing of a complaint 
against Holton, some three years passed before his ostensible 
confession which implicated the respondent. Inexplicably, 
with the case "resolved" against Holton, another three months 
passed before a complaint and arrest warrant for the respondent 
issued. In the interim, the respondent had taken up living in 
Wyoming. Another year passed and he was arrested there to face 
a four year-old case which, according to the appellant, could 
not have been filed prior to Holton's confession, (appellant's 
brief, p.12). Yet, as trial approached the appellant was unaware 
of Holton's whereabouts. Without Holton's presence, his con-
fession implicating the respondent would be inadmissible under 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, and Bruton v. United States, 
391 u. s. 123 (1968). If Holton was somehow to have been pro-
duced for a trial, his testimony as an accomplice, under the law 
in effect at the time of the offense, would have required cor-
roboration. In addition to these factors, the court was re-
quired to weigh the expense in time and money to the parties 
if this litigation was to continue as well as the propriety of 
consuming scarce judicial resources with a case of this age and 
nature. While there may be those who would disagree with the 
lower court's decision, a fair consideration of the preceding 
factors could hardly lead to the conclusion that its decision 
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was an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant nevertheless argues that because the court 
failed to specify its reasons for the dismissal in its order, 
the order should be dismissed, and Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 
19 u. 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967) is cited as support for that 
proposition. This contention contains two fatal flaws. 
The order in this case was prepared by the appellant 
and it is now the appellant who seeks to attack the very order 
it prepared. It would seem ludicrous to permit the appellant 
to complaint of defects in the order. This court should apply 
a construction to the order similar to what it would apply if 
it was a contract, that "language in a written instrument is 
interpreted more strongly against a scrivener who executes it, 
Skousen v. Smith, 27 U.2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972). The appel-
lant, having chosen to prepare the order, should now be estopped 
from attacking it. A contrary decision would permit any dis-
gruntled party to bring a successful appeal through the proce-
dural artifice of filing a flawed order. 
If the Court permits the appellant to assail the order, 
it nevertheless should be sustained because the reasons it was 
granted are clear. Salt Lake City v. Hanson is cited by the 
appellant as authority for the proposition that unless the 
judge granting an order of dismissal specifies the reasons for 
the dismissal his order is improper. Hanson does not apply to 
the present case. In Hanson, although the Court disapproved 
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the lower court's entry of an order of dismissal without 
specifying its reasons, the Supreme Court did not appear to 
reverse the lower court on that grounds. Rather, the Court 
fully discussed the two reasons orally advanced by the lower 
court for its order and found them to be insufficient justifica-
tions for a dismissal. Further, the concurring opinion of 
Justice Ellett in the Hanson case at 425 P.2d 776, discloses 
another factor distinguishing it from this appeal. There the 
trial judge is quoted as saying upon entering the order of dis-
missal that he is qbout to give someone "the shock of their 
life." Where no warning is given it would be a benefit to both 
parties to know the reasons for the dismissal. 
This appeal sharply contrasts with the Hanson case. 
Here no one received the "shock of their life." The reasons 
for which the respondent sought to have the lower court invoke 
its discretion to dismiss the case were spelled out in writing 
in specific detail and were reiterated at the hearing on the 
motion to dismiss the case. The rule is that, "an order will 
not be contrued as going beyond the motion in pursuance of 
which it is given," Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy, 73 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1937). Thus, although the appellant chose not to 
state the reasons for the dismissal in the order it prepared 
for the court's signature, there is no great mystery as to why 
the order was granted. It was granted for the reasons suggested 
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by the respondent in his motion and argument. Under the 
Pomeroyrul~ those are the only reasons the order could have 
been based upon. Therefore, the concern of the Hanson case, 
that, "the judge who assumes the serious responsibility of 
dismissing a case [be required] to set forth his reasons for 
doing so in order that all may know what invokes the court's 
discretion and whether its action is justified," 425 P.2d 773, 
775, has been met. The reasons for the invocation of the 
court's discretion are clear. The order should be upheld. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS MANDATES A 
DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE. 
If this Court concludes that the lower court judge 
acted beyond the bounds of his discretion in dismissing the 
charges in the interests of justice under Section 77-51-4, it 
nevertheless should affirm the dismissal because permitting 
the prosecution to proceed would violate the respondent's con-
stitutional rights to due process of law. 
In United State v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), it was 
held that the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not 
take effect until an accusation or arrest has been made. How-
ever, it was also said that if an accused could show actual 
prejudice resulting from a delay between the alleged offense 
and his arrest, the trial court in the exercise of its discre-
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tion, could dismiss the prosecution on due process grounds. 
In the present case, the actual prejudice to the defendant 
is apparent. 
As noted, four years passed between the alleged in-
cident and respondent's arrest. He had been told no charges 
would be filed against him, consequently no effort was made 
to locate witnesses in his behalf. He has no idea where his 
alleged accomplice turned accuser is located so his attorneys 
cannot interview him. If the Tooele County Attorney had timely 
filed.its case it would now be long over. Further, if it had 
filed the case during or before the time the respondent was 
incarcerated, he could have and would have demanded the dis-
position of the charges pursuant to Section 77-65-4, u.c.A. 
(1953). Appellant's delay in filing deprived him of his right 
to a disposition. 
The actual prejudice to the respondent from the delay 
in charging him is readily apparent. The lower court's dis-
missal was an appropriate recognition of his right to due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should consider striking the brief filed by 
the Tooele County Attorney because he has exceeded his authority 
in taking that action. If it does not do so, it should affirm 
the lower court's order dismissing the prosecution as a proper 
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exercise of that court's discretion. 
DATED this 3C -t-_1.- day of /(i~lj;,/ , 1980. 
Resp~et~ily submitted, 
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